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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. has become increasingly involved with failed and 
failing states since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.  
Further, failed and failing states are forecast to remain a 
national security issue well into the future.  United States 
involvement with failed and failing states has primarily 
focused around reconstruction and stability operations, and 
crisis management efforts.  Previous reconstruction and 
stability efforts have been wrought with inefficiency and 
agency stovepipes.  The United States believes a whole 
government approach is the solution to effective 
reconstruction and stability operations.  While most agree, 
interagency cooperation is imperative to the whole 
government approach, interagency cooperation is difficult to 
achieve in practice.  The United States State Department has 
been placed in charge of reconstruction and stability 
operations but has limited resources available.  The 
Department of Defense is the only agency with the resources 
available.  The Department of State and Department of 
Defense resources, organizational structure, and 
capabilities are compared.  Reconstruction and stabilization 
efforts of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 
and Iraq are examined.  An analysis utilizing Game Theory is 
performed to determine key mechanisms increasing interagency 
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With the ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the 
U.S. became increasing involved with failed and failing 
states.  This involvement continues to rise, and is expected 
to remain a threat to U.S. National Security for the near 
future.  John Herbst, Coordinator for the Office of 
Reconstruction and Stabilization said the following in 
testimony before the House Armed Service Committee (2007). 
Weak and failed states pose a serious security 
challenge for the United States and the 
international community.  They can become 
breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, trafficking in humans and 
narcotics, organized crime, and humanitarian 
catastrophes.  
Furthermore, failed and failing states are forecast to 
remain a National Security issue well into the future.  The 
U.S. Joint Forces Command (2010) had the following to say 
about failed and failing states in the Joint Operating 
Environment: 
Weak and failing states will remain a condition 
of the global environment over the next quarter 
of a century.  Such countries will continue to 
present strategic and operational planners 
serious challenges, with human suffering on a 
scale so large that it almost invariably spreads 
throughout the region, and in some cases 
possesses the potential to project trouble 
throughout the globalized world. (p. 50) 
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The U.S. continues to strive for possible solutions in 
an effort to battle the continuing threat.  U.S. government 
leadership knows the solution will contain a whole 
government approach requiring effective interagency 
collaboration.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has evolved its 
reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) approach in an effort 
to unify interagency partners.  In the 1990s, President 
Clinton enacted Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC 56 
Managing Complex Contingency Operations attempting to 
formally bring together interagency organizations 
collaborating on R&S crises and operations.  In 2001, 
National Security Presidential Directive 1 began to 
operationalize the four elements of national power: 
diplomatic, informational, military and economic 
(DIME). NSPD-1 outlined the organization of the National 
Security Council System to accomplish this task.  In 2004, 
President Bush established the U.S. Department of State 
(DoS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) in an effort to correct the U.S. 
perceived unpreparedness in Iraq.  The process continued 
with the signing of NSPD-44: Management of Interagency 
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, which 
placed the DoS in charge of coordinating and leading all 
integrated United States Government efforts in R&S crises 
and operations.   
The ability to improve U.S. R&S operations and crisis 




interagency organizations understand the need to 
collaborate, the expertise and resources required for an 
effective whole government approach is lacking. 
B. PROBLEM 
Establishment of the S/CRS and NSPD 44 has made DoS 
responsible for coordination and the leader of U.S. R&S 
operational and crisis management efforts.  DoS has been 
placed in-charge, however, it has not been given resources 
to carry out the task.  In addition to insufficient funding 
and resources, R&S operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
followed U.S. military action and occupation.  Occupying 
U.S. military forces have been required to perform R&S 
operations.  While on paper DoS should have the lead in R&S 
operations, the Department of Defense (DoD) already has 
soldiers on the ground and requisite resources to conduct 
R&S operations.  Without the DoD resources, DoS has 
essentially no capability to carry out R&S operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  President Barack Obama made the 
following statement following a 17,000-troop increase in 
Afghanistan:  
We are going to need more effective coordination 
of our military efforts with diplomatic efforts 
with developmental efforts with more effective 
coordination with our allies in order to be more 
successful. (Obama, 2009) 
While an understanding that a whole government approach 
is needed for R&S operations is key, it does not directly 
correlate into effective interagency collaboration.  
Interagency cooperation, especially between DoS and DoD, is 
paramount for successful R&S operations.  As R&S operations 
 4
in Iraq and Afghanistan continue the question arises; what 
can effectively increase DoD and DoS cooperation in R&S 
operations? 
The cooperative aspect of interagency operations does 
not come naturally to government or civilian agencies.  
While individual agencies recognize the importance of 
cooperation, they tend to be more concerned with individual 
goals and responsibilities.  According to Olsen (2008),  
Whatever the value of coordination, which is 
generally recognized as a good thing, it means 
giving up some degree of autonomy to others, 
which also generally involves limits on what one 
can do unilaterally – that is, coordination can 
reduce efficiency of an individual agency to 
carry out task-specific, agency-specific 
objectives. (p. 225) 
In addition, each government or civilian agency fosters 
vastly different cultural values, perspectives, and 
structures.  A report on an Army After Next experiment 
comments that: 
The diversity of the interagency, with each 
agency having its own culture, hierarchy, bias, 
misperceptions, and unique perspectives, makes 
unity of effort difficult. (Tucker, 2000, p. 1)   
This results in agency decision makers approaching 
interagency negotiations with a competitive decision making 
mentality.   
When conducting interagency collaborations or 
negotiations, most participants are trained to approach the 
bargaining table as if they are engaged in a zero-sum game—
that is, if another agency wins, my agency loses. This 
approach reflects classic competitive decision making.  If 
 5
DoD and DoS collaborations or negotiations are shifted to 
cooperative decision making, the level of DoD and DoS 
cooperation in R&S operations will increase.  The increases 
in cooperation will lead to improved effectiveness of R&S 
operations.  Additionally, during many stability and 
reconstruction operations a major limiting factor in the 
effectiveness of operations is clearly defined, unified 
goals.  The level to which DoD and DoS can develop clearly 
defined, agreed upon operational goals that are known and 
understood by all participants will determine the 
effectiveness of the R&S operation. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
Several assumptions have been made in evaluating the 
effectiveness of increasing interagency decision making to 
increase collaboration.  First, the DoS and DoD are the two 
major decision making players influencing R&S crisis 
management and mission operations.  The DoS has been placed 
in charge of R&S while the DoD has larger resources and 
annual budgets.  The DoS country team or ambassador is 
typically in charge of the country or area of operation.  
However, in Afghanistan and Iraq the DoD has been conducting 
military operations on the ground prior to R&S operations.  
The DoD military troops on the ground and its vast resources 
are required to support R&S operations.  Second, the 
organizations involved in R&S crisis management and 
operations, namely DoS and DoD, agree that a whole 
government approach is needed.  In addition to the 
organizations as a whole, the DoS and DoD decision makers at 
the operational and tactical level believe a whole 
government approach is the solution.  Third, failed and 
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failing states will continue to be a national security issue 
for the U.S. in the future.  Since the U.S. sees failed and 
failing states as a national security issue, the U.S. will 
commit R&S resources and troops to diffuse the issue. 
The final set of assumptions relate to interactions 
between DoS and DoD during R&S crisis management and 
operations.  Despite cultural and organizational 
differences, it was assumed that both organizations and 
their decision makers make reasonable decisions with 
foreseeable outcomes that further their goals.  It was 
assumed decision makers of both organizations act as 
reasonable actors in the Game Theory analysis.       
D. THESIS 
The impetus for this thesis was to determine key 
factors that will facilitate an increase in interagency 
collaboration.  Interagency collaboration is a combination 
of U.S. governmental agencies knowledge, networks, 
knowledge, and resources.  Interagency collaboration 
includes the ability to bring together human and material 
resources required to conduct R&S crisis management and 
operations.  The ability to transition DoD and DoS decision 
making from competitive to cooperative will increase 
interagency collaboration during R&S crisis management and 
operations.  The ability to shift to cooperative decision 
making requires incentives, promises, and a threat of 
retribution.  Achieving cooperative decision making during 
R&S operations requires unity of command, unified funding, 
incentives for individuals and organizations to promote 
collaboration, and unfettered information sharing leading to 
clearly defined goals and operating procedures.  Scope was 
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limited to the decision-making interaction of DoD and DoS 
during R&S crisis management and operations.  DoD and DoS 
are the main interagency players during R&S operations and 
thus are the focus of this study.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
The ensuing chapters compare and contrast DoS and DoD 
R&S crisis management and operational capabilities.  
Comparison focuses on organizational construct, 
capabilities, and resources available.  U.S. government 
documents and reports were analyzed to provide current R&S 
capabilities and resources.   
Case studies of three Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs) were evaluated.  The PRTs used include U.S.-led PRTs 
employed in Afghanistan, U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq, and United 
Kingdom (U.K.) led PRTs in Afghanistan.  These case studies 
were examined to determine the level of interagency 
collaboration, overall effectiveness, and level of 
interagency cooperative decision making.  Empirical data on 
PRT’s in Afghanistan and Iraq are based on open-source 
published accounts including analytical literature. 
Further examination includes a Game Theory analysis of 
DoD and DoS decision making.  Game Theory is a branch of 
applied mathematics and economics studying human 
interactions using rules of play and alternate choices 
(Levine, 2010).  The formal modeling approach replicates a 
social situation specifying player’s options, incentives, 




maximize individual returns.  The modeling will provide a 
clear picture of DoD and DoS decision making with respects 
to interagency collaboration.   
One challenge of using game theory is the assumption of 
rational actors.  Decision makers do not always act in a 
rational manner.  We rarely, if ever, know with 100% 
certainty what each decision maker was thinking during 
negotiations or what personal biases effected their 
decisions. Additionally, decision maker’s objectives may 
differ from assumed values used in the Game Theory model. 
The effect of this assessment is intended to increase 
U.S. interagency collaboration and overall R&S 
effectiveness.  While the agencies involved understand the 
need for a whole of government approach, the execution has 
had limited success.  With the U.S. government facing 
mounting debt and the global economy continuing to stall, 
future R&S funding will likely be limited.  The ability of 
the DoS and DoD to effectively collaborate during R&S crisis 
management and operations will play a vital role in mission 
success.   
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II. STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES AND 
CULTURE COMPARED: DOS VERSUS DOD 
In an effort to increase coordination and the whole 
government approach to R&S operations, President Bush in 
December 2005, signed NSPD 44: Management of Interagency 
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.  The 
purpose of NSPD 44 was to increase coordination, planning, 
and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization 
operations in foreign countries (Bush, 2005).  The need to 
establish a single agency, responsible for coordination of 
R&S operations, was realized.  NSPD 44 states  
The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead 
integrated United States Government efforts, 
involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with 
relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and 
conduct stabilization and reconstruction 
activities. The Secretary of State shall 
coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of 
Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned 
or ongoing U.S. military operations across the 
spectrum of conflict. (Bush, 2005) 
While NSPD 44 established the DoS as lead agency for 
coordination, the DoD has significantly more resources and 
budget available.  This chapter describes DoS and DoD R&S 
structure, policies, and resources. 
A. DOS CAPABILITIES 
In July 2004, the S/CRS was initially established by 
the Secretary of State, and later under section 408 of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-447) 
(Lepak, 2009, p. 35).  Buss (2005) stated that the creation 
of S/CRS was an attempt to close key gaps in civilian 
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planning and operational capacity that had previously 
jeopardized reconstruction operations (p. 3).  The current 
stated mission of the S/CRS is  
To lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. 
government civilian capacity to prevent or 
prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help 
stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition 
from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach 
a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a 
market economy. (U.S. Department of State, 2010)  




Figure 1.   S/CRS organization chart (From U.S. 
Department of State, 2010) 
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The S/CRS incorporates the Interagency Management 
System (IMS), the Civil Response Corps (CRC), and the 
planning framework for reconstruction and stabilization to 
facilitate this mission.     
The IMS for R&S was approved March 2007.  The three-
tiered scalable system is used to coordinate relevant 
agencies planning and mobilization actions during R&S crises 
operations.  IMS is a management system coordinating 
interagency effort. The system is comprised of the following 
three tiers: 
1.  Country reconstruction and stabilization 
group (CRSG).  A Washington-based decision-making 
body equivalent to a policy coordinating 
committee (PCC) with a planning and operations 
staff. 
2.  Integration planning cell (IPC).  A civilian 
planning cell deployed to the relevant geographic 
combatant command or multinational headquarters 
to integrate and synchronize civilian and 
military planning. 
3.  Advance civilian team (ACT).  A team 
consisting of one or more subordinate interagency 
management and coordination field advance 
civilian teams that deploy to support the chief 
of mission. (U.S. Army, 2008, pp. B1-B2) 
Previous attempts to construct a CRSG have produced 
inefficiencies and unneeded redundancy.  In an effort to 
address an expanding crisis in Sudan, the S/CRS in 2005, 
stood up a CRSG with limited success.  According to 
Bensahel, Oliker, & Peterson (2009),  
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The creation of a new CRSG for Sudan with a 
separate leadership structure led to unnecessary 
duplication, and the CRSG subsequently merged 
with the existing regional PCC. (p. 42)   
The IPC does not create plans; their job is to help 
integrate civilian and military planning for specified 
crisis.  The problem is “S/CRS has yet to develop a civilian 
contingency plan.  Without such a plan, the IPC has nothing 
to integrate with military contingency plans” (Bensahel, 
Oliker, & Peterson, p. 43).  While ACTs are a good idea, 
minimal current staffing has prevented a good idea from 
producing results.    
The Civil Response Corps is the S/CRS organizational 
construct to build a standing and reserve force of trained 
deployable civilians for S&R crisis response and operations.  
The Corps has three levels including an active, standby, and 
reserve component.   
1.  Active Component (CRC-A) officers are full-
time Government employees whose specific job is 
to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction, 
stabilization and conflict prevention efforts. 
They are able to deploy within 48 hours and focus 
on critical initial interagency functions such as 
assessment, planning, management, administrative, 
logistical, and resource mobilization.  
2.  Standby Component (CRC-S) officers are full-
time employees of their departments who have 
specialized expertise useful in reconstruction 
and stabilization operations and are available to 
deploy within 30 days in the event of a 
reconstruction and/or stabilization operation.  
3.  Reserve Component (CRC-R) officers are U.S. 
citizens who have committed to be available 
within 45-60 days of call-up to serve as U.S. 
Government temporary employees in support of 
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overseas reconstruction and stabilization 
operations. Reserve officers are critical to 
efforts to bring “normalcy” to countries by 
filling capabilities career U.S. Government 
employees simply cannot match in expertise or in 
number. (Please Note: the Reserve component has 
not yet been funded.)(Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2010)  
The Secretary of State requested funding for 250 full-
time active employees, 2,000 standby members, and proposed 
to build a reserve force for the Civil Response Corp (Office 
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 
2010).  If the Civil Response Corps attains the desired 
manning level, the resource could be a significant asset for 
R&S operations.  As of the end of 2009, the staffing was 
nowhere close to proposed levels.  At that time, the Civil 
Response Corps was comprised of two components: 78 full-time 
Active members and 554 Standby members (Office of the 
Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction, 2009, p. 8). 
The planning framework for Reconstruction, 
Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation was developed as 
a guide for U.S. government planners to create civilian R&S 
operations plans.  The DoD assisted S/CRS in developing the 
framework.  Originally drafted in 2005, extensive 
coordination delayed the release date until 2008.  The 
version released was a significantly scaled down version 
highlighting only the framework’s principles.  The R&S PCC 
approved the abbreviated framework in May 2008.  The 
approved document outlines crisis-response planning and long 
term scenario-based planning.  Long-term scenario-based 
planning is similar to military contingency or deliberate 
planning. 
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The planning process consists of a four-stage process: 
situation analysis, policy formation, strategy development, 
and interagency implementation planning.  The process is 
designed to be a planning cycle, with each stage revising 
and contributing to the other stages.  Situational analysis 
for R&S planning should include a comprehensive interagency 
assessment using the Interagency Conflict Assessment 
Framework (ICAF) and include existing data from prior 
planning and intelligence from interagency partners 
(Principles of the USG Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation, 
2008, p. 3).  Policy formation is the stage where the 
overall R&S policy is developed and plan implementation 
tasks are developed.  The CRSG or PCC planning team then 
uses the policy statement to develop a strategic plan during 
the strategic development stage.  R&S operations likely to 
involve significant U.S. military presence require the 
combination of planning efforts between the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders and planning in Washington (Principles 
of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, 
Stabilization and Conflict Transformation, p. 4).  The final 
step is Interagency Implementation planning culminating the 
planning process in the field to finalize the R&S strategy 
and plan.  The Principles of the USG Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation 
state, “Interagency implementation planning is an 
interactive process to synchronize diplomatic, development, 
and defense implementation planning and tasks” (p. 5).  The 




allowing for real-time updates and changes to the strategy 
and plan based on real world intelligence and situational 
changes.   
The planning framework has been developed over the past 
five years and continues to be a work in progress.  
Initially, vast differences in civilian and military 
planning cultures presented barriers.  The planning culture 
continues to move towards the military contingency based 
planning as the S/CRS continues to evolve.  According to 
Bensahel, Oliker, & Peterson (2009): 
S/CRS initially shared the State Department’s 
planning culture, which focuses on problematic 
planning for the next fiscal year (FY) and not on 
planning for unseen contingencies.  Over time, 
however, the office’s specific mission led it to 
adopt the more contingency-planning approaches in 
support of its long-term, scenario based 
planning….It has not yet been used to develop a 
contingency plan that can be integrated with 
existing military plans. (p. 41)  
There has been progress, but limited staffing has 
hampered development of long-term scenario based plans 
capable of being integrated with military contingency plans. 
B. DOD CAPABILITIES 
In the past, the DoD has been focused mostly on combat 
operations to win wars.  Recent low intensity conflicts, 
humanitarian efforts, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
highlighted a need for the U.S. military to perform 
stability and reconstruction operations.  Extended counter-
insurgency operations followed the initial success of regime 
removal in Afghanistan and Iraq.  During the counter-
insurgency operations, the U.S. military was and is still 
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needed to provide security and conduct R&S operations.  The 
DoD is the only organization with the abundant resources 
required fully supporting needed R&S operations globally.  
With that being said, the DoD is continually improving and 
building R&S capabilities in order to meet growing demand.  
In an effort to increase R&S capacity DoD, has made 
stability operations a core capability, increased joint 
planning guidance to include R&S operations, instituted 
programs to increase DoD regional knowledge, and stood up 
Combatant Commands (COCOMs) focused on R&S operations versus 
traditional combat operations.     
Following lessons learned from R&S operations before 
and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the DoD 
released DoD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005.  The 
Directive made stability operations a “core mission” for the 
first time, essentially on the same level with combat 
operations for the U.S. military.  According to the DODI 
3000.05 (2009), 
The Department of Defense shall be prepared to:  
Conduct stability operations activities 
throughout all phases of conflict and across the 
range of military operations, including in combat 
and non-combat environments….Support stability 
operations activities led by other U.S. 
Government departments or agencies…, foreign 
governments and security forces, international 
governmental organizations, or when otherwise 
directed. (p. 2) 
The DoD needs to have the capability of conducting 
stability operations on its own with no support from other 
U.S. governmental agencies.  The core mission designation 
increases resources, training, and budget demands to ensure 
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U.S. military forces are capable of conducting R&S 
operations at the high standard expected from U.S. military.   
In addition to making stability operations a core 
mission, DoD also has expanded its planning guidance to 
include contingency plans for stability operations.  Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (2010) broadens military planning guidance 
to include noncombat activities for stabilizing countries or 
regions, preventing hostilities and post combat activities 
that emphasize stabilization, reconstruction, and transition 
governance to civil authorities.  Joint doctrine recognizes 
the following six phases of military operations as spelled 
out in JP 3-0.    
  
Figure 2.   Phasing Model (From Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2010) 
The Joint planning process addresses each of the six 
phases during plan development.  DoD uses the planning 
process to develop military campaign plans and contingency 
plans for R&S operations that do not include traditional 
combat operations.  The R&S operations typically take place 
during phases IV and V.    
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Stability operations are necessary to ensure that 
the threat (military and/or political) is reduced 
to a manageable level that can be controlled by 
the potential civil authority or, in noncombat 
situations, to ensure that the situation leading 
to the original crisis does not reoccur or its 
effects are mitigated. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2010, p. IV-29) 
According to Ruiz (2009),  
Non-combat forces, such as civil affairs, 
information operations, medical, engineers, and 
military police, have an increased level of 
effort during the shape and enable civil 
authority phases. (p. 11) 
The DoD continues to pursue cultural awareness and 
diversification programs in an effort to increase R&S 
capabilities.  According to Christoff and Laurent (2007):  
The military services also have taken 
complementary actions to improve stability 
operations capabilities.  For example, the Marine 
Corps has established a program to improve 
cultural awareness training, increase civil 
affairs planning in its operational headquarters, 
and established a Security Cooperation Training 
Center.  Navy officials highlighted service 
efforts to (1) align its strategic plan and 
operations concept to support stability 
operations, (2) establish the Navy Expeditionary 
Combat Command, and (3) dedicate Foreign Area 
Officers to specific countries as their key 
efforts to improve stability operations 
capabilities. (p. 13) 
Senior military leadership is aware of the need for 
language and cultural training.   
No training is more crucial to the U.S. military 
than education in critical foreign languages and 
cultures, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff said yesterday. (Kruzel, 2009)   
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The U.S. military has continued to develop cultural 
awareness training for individuals prior to deployment.  The 
ability to understand adversarial and host nation cultures 
is required in conducting successful R&S operations. 
DoD has also targeted two specific COCOMs to emphasize 
stability operations.  According to Bensahel, Oliker, & 
Peterson (2009): 
In fact, two U.S. Combatant Commands (COCOMs), 
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the nascent 
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), are more focused 
on building security relationships and preventing 
conflict than on combat operations. (p. 6) 
Looking forward, the DoD has determined the need to 
promote and conduct R&S operations in the regions controlled 
by SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM.  DoD has thus structured those 
COCOMs in an effort to respond to and conduct R&S operations 
when required.  According to Shin (2009), “AFRICOM offers a 
new way to respond to crises, and to prevent fragile states 
in Africa from relapsing into instability” (p. 30).  
Additionally McFate (2008) believes more than any other DoD 
initiative, AFRICOM demonstrates that DoD recognizes that 
security and development are inextricably linked and must be 
delivered simultaneously (pp. 10-16).   
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL CHALLENGES: DOS AND DOD  
The ability to bring different government agencies 
together to accomplish a common goal is challenging at best.  
Defense Secretary Robert Gates (2010) criticized the 
interagency process in a speech at the Nixon Center saying,  
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America's interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of 
jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated 
and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent 
shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.  
Contributing to the difficulty in DoS and DoD 
collaborations, are the facts that these two agencies have 
vastly different cultures, organizational structures, and 
capabilities and resources available to conduct R&S 
operations.  Rife & Hansen (1998) characterize the cultural 
differences between DoS and DoD by saying, “These two 
cultures are as alien as life forms from two competing 
planets.  They are generally polar opposites in character, 
in approach to problem solving, and in worldview” (p. 3).  
These cultural differences between DoS and DoD lead to 
differing agency goals and operational methods to achieve 
those goals.  According to Kem (2007),  
Competing claims and “tribal rivalries” are a 
concern when there are dramatic differences in 
the cultures of the different agencies….Within 
each department, there is also a natural 
resistance to change and transformation. (p. 12) 
The culture differences exist and the process of change does 
not come quickly.   
There also exists a major cultural difference in 
operational planning philosophy and methods.  The DoD spends 
a lot of time and resources planning for contingency 
operations throughout the world.  The DoS has limited 
planning resources and spends the majority of those 
resources on crisis management planning.  The stark 
differences in planning cultures have prevented the required 
collaborative planning effort necessary for effective R&S 
mission execution.   
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The DoD is characterized by a rigid hierarchical 
organizational structure, while the DoS has a much more 
flexible structure.  The disparity in organizational 
structure leads to problems in decision making when 
individuals from DoD and DoS are forced to work together 
during interagency R&S operations.  DoD members are familiar 
with strict command structures and accountability, while DoS 
members come from an organizational culture with less 
defined structure.  The immense disparity in resources 
available to DoD and DoS is also problematic in conducting 
R&S operations.  While the S/CRS from the DoS may be in 
charge of the operations, the R&S operations require DoD 
resources.  Additionally significant R&S funding is coming 
from DoD in the form of 1207 Funds.  There is no single pot 
of money funding R&S operations. 
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III. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are civil-
military organizations established near the end of 2002.  
They were designed to draw together civilian and military 
capabilities in R&S operations.  The PRT model initially 
started in Afghanistan and subsequently expanded to Iraq in 
2005.  As of 2009, there were 23 PRTs operating in Iraq 
(Provincial Reconstruction Teams Fact Sheet, 2009).  In 
addition, there are currently 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, 12 of 
which are under U.S. command (Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams, 2010).  PRT models vary greatly with no real 
standardized model existing. Three PRT models, U.S.-led PRTs 
in Afghanistan, U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq, and the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif are discussed 
later.  While the PRT concept started with U.S. components, 
the idea has spread to International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) partners.  The concept of PRTs is essentially 
the same in Afghanistan and Iraq, but structure and 
components are different.  PRTs in Afghanistan tend to have 
military leadership, whereas a DoS Foreign Service officer 
runs PRTs in Iraq.  There exists no top-level interagency 
body to oversee and coordinate interagency PRT activities.  




Figure 3.   Afghan PRT locations (From ISAF Maps & Logos, 
2010) 
In Afghanistan, PRTs were initially positioned under 
U.S. forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) until Oct 
2006, when “All of the PRTs in Afghanistan have been under 
one theater military command (ISAF) since October 5, 2006” 
(ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook Edition 4, 
2010, P. 1).  While ISAF retains theater level control, 
individual countries maintain tactical control at the PRT 
level.  In Iraq, the U.S. maintains theater level control of 
all PRTs.  With the transition to Iraqi control in 2007, the 
Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) was created within the 
U.S. Embassy Bagdad to provide operational oversight to PRTs 
(Perito, 2008, p. 49).  This is consistent with the civilian 
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nature of PRT leadership in Iraq.  However, PRTs in Iraq are 
still very dependent on DoD logistical support to travel and 
operate (United States Institute of Peace, 2007, P. 7).   
 
 
Figure 4.   PRTs in Iraq by province (From U.S. Embassy 
Bagdad Iraq, 2010) 
PRT structure or makeup was not standardized allowing 
maximum flexibility in accomplishing the mission.  In 
addition to a lack of standardization, there existed no PRT 
doctrine or agreements between interagency organizations to 
specific tasks, requirements, or expectations of roles in 
PRTs.  According to Perito (2008), 
PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq lack an overarching 
strategy, set of common objectives, and a common 
concept of operation and organizational 
structure. (p. 5) 
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Without overarching guidance, each country leading a 
PRT developed their own size and structure in an effort to 
maximize available resources and capabilities.  This lack of 
oversight has contributed to the vast difference in PRT 
structures across Afghanistan and Iraq.  While the lack of 
standardized structure, doctrine, and agreed upon concept of 
operations has increased PRT flexibility, it has also 
hindered cooperative interagency decision making. 
B. U.S. PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN 
U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan consist of 60-120 
individuals.  They included a small number of U.S. civilians 
including representatives from DoS, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).  If the civilian agencies 
could not support the required positions, it was left to the 
U.S. military to fill the bodies.  In addition to U.S. 
members, a representative from the Afghan Ministry of 
interior was assigned to the PRT.  The U.S. military 
components included a PRT commander, two civil affairs 
teams, operational and administrative staffs, and force 
protection elements (United States Agency for International 
Development [USAID], 2006, p. 8).  The goals of the Afghan 
PRTs were to improve security, extend the reach of the 
Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in priority 
provinces (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2007, p. 56).  
Figure 5 shows the U.S. PRT structure utilized in 
Afghanistan.   
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Figure 5.   Structure of U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan (From 
Government Accountability Office, 2008) 
The main objective during PRT inception was to have 
military and civilian members of the PRT collaborate 
maximizing the capabilities of the PRT.  In theory, this was 
an excellent idea; however, the ability to collaborate was 
rarely if ever maximized in practice.  There was a lack of 
doctrine or standards established defining roles within the 
PRT.  Fraser (2009) supports doctrine defining PRT roles 
saying: 
Defining the civil-military relationship serves 
to create an effective team and delineating joint 
doctrine for “team building” aspect of operations 
will only enhance these CM relationships. (p. 12) 
Initially, some military PRT commanders were confused 
by the role of civilians within PRTs.   
While initial guidance gave civilians decision-
making leadership on reconstruction and 
governance issues, many military officers viewed 
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civilians as more advisory and believed the 
commander had final authority over all PRT 
activities, especially when security challenges 
seemed paramount. (United States Agency for 
International Development [USAID], 2006, P. 13) 
The lack of clear roles within the PRT caused initial 
confusion and when not addressed by a competent PRT 
commander, led to continued PRT problems.   
If the military commander of the U.S.-led PRT did 
not proactively incorporate non-DoD 
representatives into PRT leadership decisions, 
the goals of the PRT suffered. (United States 
Agency for International Development [USAID], 
2006, p. 10) 
While a military officer technically led the PRTs, 
there was no real command over civilian personnel.  
According to officials from State, USAID, and USDA, 
civilian officials assigned to PRTs report to 
their agencies for administrative matters; for 
example, a State official at the U.S. embassy 
conducts performance ratings for State Officials 
assigned to PRTs. (Government Accountability 
Office, 2008, P. 5) 
This leads the DoS member of a PRT to promote DoS agendas 
and projects into PRT decision making.  In an effort to keep 
his boss or performance rater in the embassy appeased, the 
DoS member of the PRT needs to push DoS agendas.  This 
causes the DoS member to agree on projects and plans aligned 
with the DoS agenda and resist ideas disagreeing with DoS 
policies.  Since the DoS individual is potentially rated on 
his ability to promote DoS policy within the PRT, the 
interagency collaboration within the PRT suffers. 
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U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan experienced a large 
disparity in DoD and DoS resources.  The DoD resources were 
overwhelming and led to disproportionate DoD influence in 
PRTs activities.  According to Perito (2008), DoD interest 
in PRTs included the new, “core U.S. military mission” of 
stability operations and as tools for winning hearts and 
minds (p. 48).  Thus, PRTs emphasized, “Quick Impact 
Projects (QIPs), small-scale short term projects aimed at 
pacifying local populations and building trust” (Perito, p. 
48).  The DoD was providing the majority of the personnel 
resources need to fill PRT positions.  While the goal was a 
mix of civilian and military members, the overwhelming 
majority of PRT members were military.  Table 1 shows the 
number of military members versus civilian personnel 
assigned to PRTs in Afghanistan.  
Table 1.  Number of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel 
Assigned to PRTs in Afghanistan, 2007-2008 (From 
Government Accountability Office, 2008) 
 
A central issue for PRT operations and decision making 
came from the various sources of funding for PRT operations.  
Funding for PRTs in Afghanistan initially came from DoD’s 
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) budget 
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(McNerney, 2006, P. 36).  Funding shifted to reconstruction 
aid through ESF and the DoD’s Commanders’ Emergency Response 
Program (CERP).  CERP funds do not have the bureaucratic 
processing associated with other funds.  According to 
Malkasian and Meyerle (2009),  
Most funding since 2004 for U.S. PRT activities 
has come from the Commanders Emergency Response 
Program (CERP), a fund designed to give U.S. 
military commanders the ability to spend money 
quickly on small projects without much 
bureaucratic processing. (p. 7)   
Additionally,  
In October 2006, Afghan PRTs began to implement a 
successor program to QIP, the new Local 
Governance and Community Development (LGCD) 
program. (Katzman, 2010, p. 54) 
Often the agency controlling project funding determined 
the type of project funded.  Whatever agency controlled the 
money, funded projects supporting their agency’s goals and 
policy objectives.  DoD has the advantage in procuring money 
since the CERP funds make up the bulk available resources 
and they are relatively easy to access. 
C. U.S-LED PRTS IN IRAQ   
U.S.-led PRTs used in Iraq are structured different and 
slightly smaller that U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan.  In Iraq 
U.S.-led PRTs, average about 60 members varying from 35-100 
members (Tarnoff, 2007, P. 19).  Civilian DoS Foreign 
Service Officers lead Iraq PRTs with the deputy commander 
being a military officer.  PRTs in Iraq had no defined goals 
or performance measures.  According to Office of the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2007): 
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in our reports on the status of the PRT Program 
in Iraq, issued in October 2006, and July 2007, 
we recommend that the U.S. Ambassador and the 
Commanding General, MNF-I develop clearly defined 
objectives and performance measures to guide the 
PRTs and determine their accomplishments.  We 
have previously noted limited actions taken to 
address this recommendation. (p. 5) 
Each PRT was essentially given flexibility to deter 
objectives and no measures of performance existed to 
determine PRT effectiveness.   
Civilian staffing is much larger in Iraq PRTs than 
Afghanistan PRTs.  While the civilian staffing is much 
larger in Iraq PRTs, the ability of the DoS to recruit 
personnel to fill PRT positions is limited.  According to a 
report from the United States Institute of Peace (2007), 
“The State Department had trouble finding volunteers, 
particularly among essential mid-level officers with 
regional experience and language skills” (p. 3).  This lack 
of qualified volunteers led the DoS to fill the positions 
with whatever individuals could be found and recruited.  The 
lack of incentive programs enticing top tier DoS individuals 
from filling PRT positions lowered the overall PRT 
capability.   
As with U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan, there were no 
agreed upon responsibilities and authorization between DoS 
and DoD positions.  According to the United States Institute 
of Peace 2007 report, 
Ambassador Khalilzad and Multinational Force 
Commander General George Casey issued an “initial 
instructions” telegram establishing the PRTs, but 
no Washington interagency-approved doctrine or 
concept of operations governed the first PRTs in 
Iraq.  Nor are there agreed objectives, 
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delineation of authority and responsibility 
between the civilian and military personnel plans 
or job descriptions. (p.3) 
Individuals assigned to PRTs were given flexibility to 
establish their own goals and get the job done.  
While the organizational chart for U.S.-led PRTs in 
Iraq appears to delineate authority, it rarely worked that 
way on the ground. Perito (2008) said,  
Each PRT has a defined leader, but these leaders 
do not exert command authority over the 
activities of other agencies’ staff members.  As 
a result, there can be incoherence in the 
planning process. (p. 50) 
The lack of clearly defined authority chain, allowed the 
planning process to have multiple agendas instead of a 
single joint process.  The lack of a single interagency 
process hindered PRT the decision-making process with each 
agency supporting its own agenda.  
There were initial disputes between DoS and DoD over 
funding and resources for PRT operations.  Security was a 
major concern for U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq and only military 
units could provide the needed security.  U.S.-led PRTs in 
Iraq are located on Foreign Operating Bases (FOB) in or near 
Provincial capitals (Perito, 2008, p. 50).  If the military 
leadership on the base were not willing to provide security 
needed for PRTs, they were helpless and unable to leave 
their FOBs.   
Interagency dispute over whether the US military 
would provide protection….led to many PRTs being 
virtually paralyzed, unable to deploy from FOBs 
for prolonged periods of time. (Perito, 2008, p. 
50)   
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Eventually, a Memorandum of Agreement between the DoD and 
DoS was signed in Feb 2007 providing U.S. military security 
to PRTs outside the FOBs (Office of the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2007, p. 5). 
PRT funding in Iraq comes from numerous agencies and 
sources. Originally, the funds came from Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund and then transitioned to the Economic 
Support Funds in three categories.  The three categories 
included PRT/PRDC program, the Local Government Program, and 
the Quick Reaction Fund (a shared DoS/ USAID fund designed 
to mimic the flexibility of DoD’s CERP)(Report on Iraq 
Relief and Reconstruction, 2007).  PRTs in Iraq also 
received funds from the DoD’s CERP.  The multiple and 
diverse nature of funding streams are confusing to 
individuals within the PRTs and the local individuals they 
are designed to help.  Michelle Parker a former PRT member 
had the following to say at a House Armed Services Committee 
Oversight and Investigations Hearing (2007),  
There must be a better alignment of mission and 
resources on a PRT level.  The military supports 
security sector reform, USAID supports 
reconstruction and development, yet neither have 
funding mechanisms that are appropriate to those 
jobs. 
D. UNITED KINGDOM’S PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN 
The U.K. operates three PRTs in Afghanistan with a 
slightly larger average size than the U.S. model.  According 
to Perito (2008),  
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The U.K. PRT model in Afghanistan averaged 100 
personnel of which around 30 are civilians; led 
by a civilian; with an emphasis on local capacity 
building, and an ability to operate in volatile 
areas. (p. 5)   
The U.K. model strives to encapsulate the whole government 
approach with coordination between Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FDO), the Department for International Development 
(DFID), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD).  Jakobsen (2005) 
says the following comparing U.K.-led PRTs to U.S.-led PRTs, 
“they [U.K.-led PRTs] differ in that the three components 
lead the PRT jointly and that the concept of operations is 
clearer” (p 21).  During the early stages of PRT use in 
Afghanistan, the U.K.-led PRTs were able to establish strong 
cohesion and buy-in between involved agencies.  Perito 
(2008) stated, “The British PRT model demonstrates a high 
level of coordination between the ministries, with clear 
differentiation of tasks between them” (p. 43). 
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU, later 
renamed the Stabilisation Unit) was established in an effort 
to institutionalize the coordination.  The Stabilisation 
Unit’s key tasks were assessment and planning, providing 
experienced civilian personnel to work in insecure 
countries, identifying collecting and disseminating lessons 
learned and works in countries at the request of parent 
Departments and the Cabinet Office (Stabilisation Unit, 
2010).  While the Stabilisation Unit has been involved in 
PRT planning since 2005, some question its ability.  
U.K.-led PRTs are working toward collective funding.  
The MOD has far and above more resources than the other two 
organizations.  However, the MOD does not have the ability 
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to fund QIPs or give grants.  The approved grants are 
managed by the DFID.  The fact the MOD has the resources but 
requires DFID to approve grants requires interaction and 
collaboration between the two agencies on funds granted.  
The U.K. is working to develop a common funding source 
approved by all three agencies.  The “stabilisation fund” 
and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool are designed to 
provide unified funding to PRTs (Perito, 2008, p. 43).  A 
common funding source approved by the three agencies would 
increase the coordination amongst PRT leadership. 
The first U.K.-led PRT was located in Mazar-e-Sharif.  
Individuals from the FDO, DFID, and MOD experienced a strong 
degree of cohesion equally heading the PRT.  The leadership 
briefed together and took responsibility for their 
organization’s responsibilities within the PRT.  The lead 
FDO representative was fluent in the local language and well 
versed in local culture enhancing the PRTs capabilities.  
Information was shared freely amongst PRT leadership.  There 
was a concerted effort not to duplicate non-governmental 
organization (NGO) efforts already conducted in the region.  
The British Government engaged in extensive pre-deployment 
consultation with NGOs, the United Nations, and the local 
community both during the planning stages and after 
initiation of activities (Perito, 2008, p. 44).  The whole 
government approach of Mazar-e-Sharif PRT became the model 
on proper PRT operation.  According to Perito (2008), “The 
Mazar PRT became known as the “British Model” and was viewed 
by many observers as the best way to organize and operate 
PRTs” (p. 44). 
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E. ANALYSIS OF PRTS 
PRTs appear to be a breakthrough approach, essentially 
bringing together interagency organizations to maximize R&S 
efforts.  In theory, PRTs should promote the whole 
government approach effectively collaborating toward common 
R&S goals and objectives.  The reality of the situation has 
not produced the results forecast in PRT conception and 
development.  Many believe while PRTs have not yet produced 
the results believed possible, they are still improving and 
providing meaningful results.  According to Drolet (2006), 
“The concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams has proven 
beneficial in both Afghanistan and Iraq” (p. 15). 
Initially, PRTs were developed in an ad hoc nature to 
quickly field the idea.  It has been over seven years since 
the first PRT was established in Afghanistan and an 
interagency PRT doctrine still does not exist.  There is a 
PRT playbook and PRT lessons learned copulation but no 
defined doctrine for PRT organization and operations similar 
to DoD Joint doctrine.  In addition, there is no real PRT 
concept of operations, mission objectives, or specific PRT 
goals.  Perito 2007 had the following to say testifying 
before the House Armed Service Committee,  
Improvisation is not a concept of operations.  
PRTs really need an agreed concept of operations 
and an agreed organizational structure with a 
single chain of command. (as cited in U.S. 
Congress. HCAS, 2008, p. 18) 
Furthermore, cooperative decision making is paramount 
in effective interagency collaboration.  The lack of 
cooperative interagency decision making has hindered  
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U.S.-led PRTs from effectively collaborating.  According to 
Ginger Cruz 2007, the Deputy Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction  
On the issue of civil-military integration, the 
problem that we are finding is that there is 
really no permanent, predictable method of 
integrating decision-making and resource-sharing.  
Instead, there is a patchwork quilt of memoranda 
of agreements and FRAGOs [fragmentary orders] and 
military orders and cables that, all together, 
sort of provide the policy underpinnings that are 
used by PRTs. (as cited in U.S. Congress. HCAS, 
2008, p. 18) 
DoD and civilian leadership has been a good fit with 
highly effective collaboration in only a limited number of 
U.S.-led PRTs.  In such cases, success was “personality 
driven.”  Success of PRTs decision making and collaboration 
cannot rely on personalities.  The HASC Oversight and 
Investigations (2008) had the following to say about 
individual personalities “Rather than depending exclusively 
on personalities for success, the right interagency 
structures and processes need to be in place and working” 
(p. 32).  The U.K.-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif was established 
with effective decision-making processes and structures in 
place, allowing for effective collaboration between the FDO, 
DFID, and MOD. 
In addition, U.S.-led PRTs have struggled with a lack 
of unified command.  There has been a defined PRT commander.  
However, that commander lacks true authority over the PRT 
and individuals assigned to the PRT.  One of the findings 
from the HASC Oversight and Investigations (2008) was  
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Neither the stabilizations and reconstruction 
activities, nor the civilian and military 
personnel serving on Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, enjoy unity of 
command.  This shortcoming inhibits unity of 
effort, which can result in uncoordinated, and 
even counterproductive, outcomes. (p. 35) 
The individuals working for the commander were 
supervised and reported to individuals outside the PRT 
organization.  This led to conflicting interests for the 
individuals working within the PRT.  Individuals within the 
PRT were compelled to promote their agency’s agendas as 
opposed to collaborative PRT agendas.   
The U.K.-led PRT model included training prior to 
individuals being assigned to PRTs from its inception.  The 
U.S. has since established training for individuals prior to 
deploying with PRTs.  The training is limited, but it does 
provide a chance for individuals to gain an awareness of 
what other interagency partners bring to the PRT.  This 
information flow has begun to break down interagency 
cultural barriers in decision making.  Training needs to 
continue expansion, increasing the information flow and 
interagency capabilities and cultural knowledge within all 
organizations. 
U.S.-led PRTs suffered from multiple and mismatched 
funding sources.  DoD CERP funds were easily accessible with 
little to no bureaucratic red tape.  This often led to DoD 
influence in PRT decision making on what projects were 
approved; since DoD was funding the project. In an effort to 
increase PRT effectiveness, PRT funding needs to have a 
single common fund.  According to Perito (2008), 
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Common funds like the U.K.s planned 
‘stabilization [sic] fund’ will encourage 
different agencies represented in the PRT to work 
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IV. MODELING ANALYSIS 
The comparison analysis of DoD and DoS R&S 
organizational structure and capabilities illustrated a 
significant DoD resource advantage.  The PRT case study 
comparison showed a lack of cooperation during decision- 
making processes negatively effects interagency 
collaboration.  The break down in interagency decision-
making cooperation was due to a lack of information sharing, 
differing agency cultural biases, uneven resource 
allocation, lack of command unity, non-existent interagency 
doctrine, and multiple funding sources.  In some cases, 
exceptional individuals were able to overcome these 
obstacles, effectively collaborating during interagency 
decision making.  The example of the U.K.-led PRT in Mazar-
e-Sharif showed how effective interagency cooperative 
decision making could enhance interagency collaboration.  In 
this chapter, Game Theory mathematical modeling is used to 
analyze DoD and DoS decision making.  Zero sum decision 
making is discussed then the game is transitioned to 
cooperative decision making.  The result of shifting to 
cooperative decision making is an increase in interagency 
collaboration.  
A. DEFININING THE GAME 
Game Theory is a branch of applied mathematics 
providing a formal modeling approach to situations in which 
decision makers interact with opposing agents, choosing 
strategies to maximize returns while taking the opponents 
strategies into account (Straffin, 1993, p. 3).  Initially, 
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zero sum decision making is discussed with no opportunities 
for DoD and DoS to cooperate.  This simulates the decision-
making idea where if DoD wins then DoS loses and if DoS wins 
then DoD loses.  The analysis will progress to a cooperative 
decision-making game where DoD and DoS have the ability to 
collaborate and increase interagency effectiveness.  Game 
theory will provide an analysis of the benefits of moving 
the DoD versus DoS decision making from a zero sum 
competitive game to a cooperative decision-making game.  The 
game further illustrates a necessity for incentives, 
promises, and the threat of retribution. 
B. QUESTIONS TO BE ANALYZED 
As the U.S. continues to conduct R&S operations, will 
moving from competitive Zero Sum decision making to 
cooperative decision making increase interagency 
collaboration between the DoD and DoS?  Additionally, what 
will maximize interagency collaboration during cooperative 
decision making between the DoD and DoS? 
C. THE ZERO SUM GAME 
Previous interagency organizations fostered cultures of 
competitive decision making.  Competitive decision making 
was based on the belief, if I win, then you lose, and if you 
win, then I lose.  This type of decision making negatively 
affects interagency collaboration since organizations are 
focused more on promoting their organizational interests and 
policies than working together for the benefit of the U.S.  
The beginning of PRT development in Iraq is an example of 
competitive decision making.  
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U.S. military forces had been in Iraq for a few years 
when the DoS began pushing to employ PRTs.  The DoD did not 
support the development of PRTs in Iraq, but the U.S. 
Government sided with the DoS and supported PRT development.  
While the DoS pushed the PRT idea in Iraq, the DoS did not 
have the resources to make Iraq PRTs self-sufficient.  The 
PRTs were located on FOBs and relied upon the DoD for 
security and almost all support functions.  In order for 
PRTs in Iraq to leave the FOBs and execute their mission, 
they needed security support from the DoD.  The DoD would 
have to sacrifice other missions to provide security support 
to PRTs.  Since the DoD did not support the development of 
PRTs in the first place, they withheld the PRT security 
support.  Without security support from DoD military units, 
PRTs were helpless and could not leave the bases they were 
assigned to.  The competitive decision-making culture led to 
a stalemate for about a year.  The DoS had won the fight to 
employ PRTs to Iraq; however, the DoD would not provide any 
support.  The DoD did not support the establishment of PRTs 
in Iraq and saw the DoS policy as a decision making loss.     
This zero sum stalemate took about a year to resolve 
when a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the DoS and DoD 
clarifying what security support PRTs in Iraq would receive.  
The U.K.-led PRT case study provides evidence cooperative 
decision making will result in effective interagency 
collaboration.  The U.K.-led PRT developed combined policies 
and goals and fully supported those policies and goals.  
When the U.K.-led PRT briefed their plans and results, all 
agencies members within the PRT stood together explaining 
the combined policies and goals.  The ability of the U.K.-
led PRT to effectively collaborate was a result of 
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cooperative decision making.  Increasing interagency 
collaboration between DoD and DoS requires the game to be 
changed from competitive decision making to cooperative 
decision making.  Transitioning the game to a cooperative 
decision-making game will create a partial sum game, 
increasing game value for individual players as well as 
overall game value. 
D. PARTIAL SUM GAME 
The Partial sum game is set up replacing opposing 
agencies strategies with a cooperative strategy.  Figure 6 
represents the set up of the partial sum game between DoD 


























AC–DoD chooses DoD policies and goals; DoS chooses DoS 
policies and goals 
AD–DoD chooses DoD policies and goals; DoS chooses combined 
policies and goals 
BC–DoD chooses combined policies and goals; DoS chooses DoS 
policies and goals 
BD–DoD chooses combined policies and goals; DoS chooses 
combined policies and goals 
The author has established the payoffs or utility of 
game.  Cooperative decision making determined the game’s 
payoffs.  The author assumes both players are rational and 
maximizing their individual outcomes.  The author has 
determined the following rankings of DoD and DoS strategies 
in Tables 2 and 3.  These values are subject to 
interpretation and individual values. 
Table 2.  DoD options 
DoD Options: 
 
4-Best.  DoD chooses DoD policies and goals; DoS chooses 
combined policies and goals 
3-Next best.  DoD chooses combined policies and goals; DoS 
chooses combined policies and goals 
2-Least best.  DoD chooses DoD policies and goals; DoS 
chooses DoS policies and goals 
1–Worst.  DoD chooses combined policies and goals; DoS 
chooses DoS policies and goals 
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Table 3.  DoS options 
DoS Options: 
 
4-Best.  DoS chooses DoS policies and goals; DoD chooses 
combined policies and goals 
3-Next best.  DoS chooses combined policies and goals; DoD 
chooses combined policies and goals 
2-Least best.  DoS chooses DoS policies and goals; DoD 
chooses DoD policies and goals 
1–Worst.  DoS chooses combined policies and goals; DoD 
chooses DoD policies and goals 
 
When the DoD choose their own policies and goals, and 
the DoS choose combined policies and goals, it provides the 
highest DoD payoff.  Typically, the DoD already has boots on 
the ground conducting operations, and will have to provide 
significant resources to support any R&S operation.  The DoD 
will have plans developed with policies and goals 
determined.  With the DoS choosing combined policies and 
goals, the DoD will have strong leverage since they are 
pushing DoD policies and goals while the DoS is pushing for 
cooperation.  The outcome will be combined policies and 
goals similar to DoD’s policies and goals. 
DoD’s second best utility is when both DoD and DoS 
choose combined policies and goals.  The DoD continues to 
place a significant emphasis on joint operations and 
training.  The DoD rewards individuals for joint duty 
assignments and education.  In addition, the DoD has a 
strong culture of doing what is required for successful 
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mission completion.  Most believe in the current 
environment, a whole government approach is needed to 
successful execute R&S missions. 
DoD’s third best utility occurs when the DoD choose DoD 
policies and goals and the DoS choose DoS policies and 
goals.  This results in a potential stalemate as resulted in 
the zero sum game.  Even though the DoD has a significant 
resource advantage the S/CRS has been placed in charge of 
R&S operations.  This situation results in the possibility 
DoS policies and goals will be adopted over DoD policies and 
goals.  Combined policies and goals allow the DoD to provide 
some input into the policies and goals, whereas the DoD has 
no say in DoS policies and goals. 
The DoD’s worst option occurs when the DoD choose 
combined policies and goals and the DoS choose DoS policies 
and goals.  This situation gives the DoS advantage in the 
decision making process.  The DoS in pushing their polices 
and goals while the DoD is working for cooperation.  The 
overall R&S policies and goals adopted are more likely to 
resemble the DoS policies and goals.  
Examining the utility of the game from the DoS 
perspective reveals similar utilities.  When the DoS choose 
their own policies and goals and the DoD choose combined 
policies and goals provide the highest DoS payoff.  The 
S/CRS of the DoS has been placed in charge of R&S operations 
and is thus potentially responsible for any R&S operation.  
The DoS wants the overall R&S policies and goals to resemble 
DoS polices and goals.  With the DoD choosing combined 
policies and goals, the DoS will have strong advantage since 
they are pushing DoS policies and goals while the DoD is 
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pushing for combined policies and goals.  The outcome will 
be combined policies and goals resembling DoS’s policies and 
goals. 
DoS’s second best utility is when both DoS and DoD 
choose combined policies and goals.  The DoS is well aware 
they do not have the resources available to support R&S 
operations.  Successful R&S operations will require DoD 
resources. While the DoS wants to promote DoS policies and 
goals to further the DoS, the DoS believes a whole 
government approach is needed for successful R&S mission 
execution. 
DoS’s third best utility occurs when the DoS choose DoS 
policies and goals and the DoD choose DoD policies and 
goals.  This results in a potential stalemate as resulted in 
the zero sum game.  This outcome is similar to DoD’s third 
best outcome discussed previously. 
The DoS’s worst option occurs when the DoS choose 
combined policies and goals and the DoD choose DoD policies 
and goals.  This situations gives the DoD advantage in the 
decision making process.  The DoD is pushing their own 
polices and goals while the DoS is working for cooperation.  
The overall R&S policies and goals adopted are more likely 
to resemble the DoD policies and goals.   
Based on the rankings of the options listed above in 
Tables 2 and 3, the following “game” is used to determine 
the Nash Equilibrium. 
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Figure 7.   DoD vs. DoS 
When visualizing the “game,” we see the classical 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  Both DoD and DoS have dominant 
strategies.  The dominant strategies are to choose the 
strategy with their organization’s policies and goals.  The 
Nash Equilibrium is at (2,2)—DoD chooses DoD policies and 
goals, and DoS chooses DoS policies and goals.  While the 
outcome (3,3) looks promising, it is very unstable since 
both DoD and DoS can improve from this position.  An example 
of the defection from combined policies and goals to 
individual organizational policies and goals was noted in 
U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan.  While a military commander 
led PRTs, the military commander did not rate the 
performance of DoS individuals within the PRT.  The 
performance of DoS individuals within the PRT was evaluated 
and documented by DoS Embassy personnel.  In an effort to 
receive good performance ratings, DoS individuals within the 
PRT pushed DoS Embassy policies and goals.  These DoS 
individuals within PRTs would support combined policies and 
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goals as long as the combined policies and goals were 
similar to the DoS Embassy policies and goals.  Once the 
combined policies and goals differed from the DoS Embassy 
policies and goals, the DoS individual would defect, 
opposing the combined policies and goals.  The military PRT 
commander would have no recourse, since they did not rate 
the DoS individual within the PRT. 
The influence project funding had on PRT policies and 
goals additionally illustrated the tendency to defect to 
individual organizational policies and goals.  Numerous 
funding sources were utilized to pay for PRT projects.  The 
result was the organization controlling the money, 
controlling the policies and goals.  In order to obtain 
project funds, the PRT project needed to support the funding 
organizations policies and goals.  The combined policies and 
goals were supported as long as those policies and goals 
sought to accomplish projects the funding organization 
wanted to see completed.  If the projects disagreed with the 
funding organizations policies and goals, the project would 
not receive funding.   
These examples illustrate the classical Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game.  Strategic moves can determine if a better 
outcome is achievable.  However, we know ultimately the 
ability to improve the game will take incentives, 
assurances, and/or threat of punishment. 
1. Strategic Moves and Prudential Security 
Potential strategic moves were evaluated for both 
players, DoD and DoS.  The starting points for the strategic 
moves are listed below. 
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-The likely outcome without communications is (2,2) 
-DoD has a dominant strategy of choosing DoD policies 
and goals 
-DoS has a dominant strategy of choosing DoS policies 
and goals 
-A Nash equilibrium exists at (2,2) 
Evaluating DoD strategic moves produces the following 
results.  A first move from DoD or forcing DoS to make the 
first move produces the DoD’s third best outcome (2,2). 
There is no improvement from playing the game without 
communications.  The DoD does not have a threat since that 
option does not hurt DoS.  The only potentially beneficial 
strategic move is a promise, which would move the game to 
(3,3) if the promise is carried out and believed by DoS.  
Evaluating DoS’s strategic moves produces the same results.  
The only beneficial strategic move is a promise, which if 
carried out and believed by the DoD would produce an outcome 
of (3,3).  The outcome for both players at (3,3) is their 
second best outcome. 
In evaluating each player’s prudential security, one 
player will be maximizing, while the other player is 
minimizing.  The DoD’s security level will be found by 
evaluating the DoD’s game while the DoD is maximizing and 
the DoS is minimizing.  The security level for each player 
demonstrates the highest value of the game that player can 




Figure 8 shows the results of the DoD’s game when 
played alone.  The DoD is attempting to maximize the game 
while DoS is attempting to minimize DoD’s outcome.  The 
prudential strategy for the DoD is choosing DoD policy and 
goals resulting in a security level of two. 
 
Figure 8.   DoD Security Level  
Figure 9 shows the results of the DoS’s game when 
played alone.  The DoS is attempting to maximize the game 
while DoD is attempting to minimize DoS’s outcome.  The 
prudential strategy for the DoS is choosing DoS policy and 
goals resulting in a security level of two. 
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Figure 9.   DoS Security Level 
The results of examining each player’s games 
individually produce security levels of two for both 
players.  It also demonstrates prudential strategies that 
are the same as the individual’s dominant strategies.  The 
security level of the game is the same as the game outcome 
when played conservatively without communications.  Interval 
scaling will be used to further examine the game to 
determine how to implement policies or agreements to 
maximize the game.  
2. Interval Scaling 
In order to further evaluate the game, an interval 
scale from zero to ten will be used to weigh the DoD and DoS 
options.  The options were ranked with ten being the best 
and zero being the worst.  The best option (and awarded a 
“10”) is for the DoD to choose DoD policies and goals while 
the DoS chooses cooperative policies and goals.  This gives 
the DoD a significant edge in ensuring the overall policies 
and goals will be similar to their policies and goals.  The 
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next best option occurs when both the DoD and DoS choose 
cooperative policies and goals.  In this case, the DoD is in 
agreement with the cooperative policies and goals, which 
will ultimately be in line with the overall operational 
policies and goals.  The value assigned to this option for 
the DoD is eight.  The DoD has shifted culture from an 
individual organization to a Joint mindset.  The operational 
focus and result-based mindset leads to a willingness to 
work together to accomplish the mission.  Even when 
organizations and individuals within the DoD do not like 
each other, they have the ability to put differences aside 
to accomplish the mission.  With that being said, the third 
best option is when DoD chooses DoD polices and goals and 
DoS chooses DoS policies and goals.  This option is given a 
value of two.  The low score is due to the potential overall 
operational polices and goals will not be aligned with DoD 
policies and goals.  The DoD’s worst outcome (awarded a 
“zero”) is occurs when the DoD chooses cooperative policies 
and goals while the DoS chooses their own policies and 
goals.  This results in the overall policies and goals 
aligning more with DoS policies and goals than DoD policies 
and goals.   
The options available to DoS are essentially in line 
with DoD options.  The best option (awarded a “10”) is for 
DoS to choose DoS policies and goals while DoD chooses 
cooperative policies and goals.  This gives the DoS a 
significant edge in ensuring overall policies and goals will 
be similar to their policies and goals.  The next best 
option occurs when both DoS and DoD choose cooperative 
policies and goals.  In this case, DoS is in agreement with 
cooperative policies and goals, which will ultimately be in 
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line with overall operational policies and goals.  The value 
assigned to this option for DoS is five.  The DoS is 
significantly smaller in size, capacity and funding compared 
to the DoD.  The political struggles for larger budgets are 
often political and based on recent accomplishment.  When 
DoS has a larger impact on overall operational policies and 
goals, it provides political capital to DoS.  In the eyes of 
DoS, this will result in larger future budgets and expanded 
roles.  With that being said, the third best option is when 
DoS chooses DoS polices and goals and DoD chooses DoD 
policies and goals.  This option is given a value of three.  
The low score is due to potential overall operational 
polices and goals that may not be aligned with DoS policies 
and goals.  The value is slightly higher than the DoD score 
on its same option since the DoS is bureaucratic and 
believes it has a political advantage in aligning the 
overall operational policies and goals with proposed DoS 
policies and goals.  The DoS’s worst outcome (awarded a 
“zero”) occurs when DOS chooses cooperative policies and 
goals, while the DoD chooses their own policies and goals.  
This results in the overall policies and goals aligning more 
with DoD policies and goals than DoS policies and goals.    
3. The Game with Cardinal Values 




Table 4.  DoD options with cardinal values assigned 
DoD Options: 
 
10-Best.  DoD chooses DoD policies and goals; DoS chooses 
combined policies and goals 
8-Next best.  DoD chooses combined policies and goals; DoS 
chooses combined policies and goals 
2-Least best.  DoD chooses DoD policies and goals; DoS 
chooses DoS policies and goals 
0–Worst.  DoD chooses combined policies and goals; DoS 
chooses DoS policies and goals 
 
Table 5.  DoS options with cardinal values assigned 
DoS Options: 
 
10-Best.  DoS chooses DoS policies and goals; DoD chooses 
combined policies and goals 
5-Next best.  DoS chooses combined policies and goals; DoD 
chooses combined policies and goals 
3-Least best.  DoS chooses DoS policies and goals; DoD 
chooses DoD policies and goals 
0–Worst.  DoS chooses combined policies and goals; DoD 
chooses DoD policies and goals 
 
The results of evaluating the game with newly assigned 




Figure 10.   DoD vs. DoS with cardinal values 
The game with cardinal values essentially produces the 
same results as the first game.  
-The likely outcome without communications is (2,3) 
-DoD has a dominant strategy of choosing DoD policies 
and goals 
-DoS has a dominant strategy of choosing DoS policies 
and goals 
-A Nash equilibrium exists at (2,3) 
-DoD’s only strategic move is a promise 
-DoS’s only strategic move is a promise 
-DoD’s prudential strategy is choosing DoD policies and 
goals results in security level two 
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-DoS’s prudential strategy is choosing DoD policies and 
goals results in security level three 
Evaluating the game, we can see the Nash Equilibrium of 
(2,3) is not an acceptable solution for the game.  While 
Nash arbitration illustrated in appendix B does provide a 
higher outcome for the game, a mixed strategy game is not 
feasible in making national security decisions.  To 
eliminate the mixed strategy requirement, the DoS value of 
the game for its second best option could be raised.  DoS’s 
second best option occurs when both the DoS and DoD choose 
cooperative policies and goals.  Raising the value from five 
to seven would result in a pure strategy solution, achieving 
the Nash Point.  The results from the likely outcome, Nash 
Equilibrium, strategic moves, and security levels would 
remain the same.  However, the Nash Point would be (8,7) 
with DoS playing a 100% strategy of combined policies and 
goals.  Potentially the use of standard operating 
procedures, memorandum of understandings, and interagency 
doctrine could increase the cardinal value of the game.  
While the value of the game could be increased to (8,7) the 
result is still unstable.  The Nash equilibrium will remain 
at (2,3).  The resulting outcome of (8,7) looks very 
promising, but as with all Prisoner’s Dilemma games, the 
only way to improve the game overall is through incentives, 
promises, and/or threat of retribution. 
4. Incentive, Promises, and Threat of Retribution 
The results of strategic moves demonstrated both DoD 
and DoS could improve with the use of a promise.  A 
successful promise requires the organization making the 
promise to be credible and able to influence the other 
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player to accept the promise.  In addition to maintaining 
the promise, a threat of retribution needs to exist.  If the 
promise is broken, either player can improve their position 
and subsequently place the other player in their worst 
position.  The use of incentives presents the same problem 
as the promise.  If there is no threat of retribution, 
either player can move the game to their optimal solution 
and the opposing player’s worst solution. 
A solution to the DoD versus DoS game is for R&S 
funding levels to be based on levels of interagency 
cooperation.  For this to work, an oversight agency or board 
would need to be created to determine the level of 
interagency cooperation.  The oversight agency would use 
defined measures of performance and effectiveness metrics to 
evaluate R&S interagency cooperation.  This would be similar 
to bonuses achieved in the civilian sector for meeting 
defined goals and milestones.  Ideally, both the DoS and DoD 
would agree upon these metrics.  When DoD and DoS both 
choose cooperative policies and goals, funding incentives 
would be provided to both the DoD and DoS R&S operational 
funds.  When both agencies choose their respective policies 
and goals, there would be no funding incentives.  These 
incentives would also work as a threat, since if they do not 
cooperate, they do not receive funding incentives.   
Furthermore, decision makers for both organizations 
need to be held accountable for the level of cooperation.  
In many cases, there is no unity of command within R&S 
operations.  The level of cooperation is high until DoD or 
DoS decision makers do not agree, then the decision making 
becomes competitive.  The examples of U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq 
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and Afghanistan provide supporting evidence.  Without a 
designated individual in charge, who is able to hold DoD and 
DoS individuals accountable, interagency cooperation is 
limited.  Unity of command within R&S operations must exist 
to provide an effective threat of retaliation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Game theory can provide a useful lens to examine 
interagency decision making between DoD and DoS during R&S 
operations.  Competitive decision-making ideologies have no 
place in interagency operations.  In order to increase 
interagency collaboration, R&S decision making needs to 
transition to cooperative decision making.  In addition, 
there needs to be an increase in the level of information 
available for DoD and DoS decision makers to maximize the 
game.  The use of R&S interagency doctrine, memorandums of 
agreement, and standard operating procedures provide 
solutions to increase the level of information available.  
The use of promises between organizations would increase the 
value of the game; however, there will need to be some 
measure of assured retribution.  Incentives are another 
possible solution to increase the game.  Funding incentives 
may be the answer, providing both incentive and threat of 
retribution.  If DoD and DoS choose to cooperate, then 
funding is increased, but when cooperation ceases funding is 
cut.  Within a system where a government organization’s 
methods of increasing funding drive their policy decisions, 
funding incentives have a lot of potential. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the future, failed and failing states are, and will, 
continue to be a national security threat to the U.S.  The 
ability for the U.S. to effectively conduct R&S operations 
and crisis management is essential to mitigating the threat 
from failed and failing states.  Since the end of the Cold 
War, the framework for conducting R&S operations has 
evolved.  The entire U.S. government agrees a whole 
government approach is needed to effectively conduct R&S 
operations and crisis management.  The two main 
organizations controlling R&S operations and crisis 
management are the DoS and DoD.  The S/CRS of the DoS has 
been placed in charge of coordinating R&S operations and 
crisis management.  Yet, they do not have the resources to 
support the operations.  The DoD is the only organization 
with the vast resources required to conduct R&S operations 
and crisis management.   
The decision-making relationship has been competitive 
between the DoD and DoS.  This produced a zero sum game 
where if one organization won the other lost.  This zero sum 
competitive decision making led to ineffective interagency 
collaboration during R&S operations.  U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq 
were basically useless for about a year due to competitive 
decision making.  The PRTs needed security provided by the 
DoD, however the DoD was not willing to provide the security 
support.  This led to the PRT being stranded helplessly on 




and DoS signed a Memorandum of Agreement establishing PRT 
security support requirements.  This allowed the PRTs to 
leave FOBs and conduct R&S operations.   
The ability to move from competitive decision making to 
cooperative decision making dramatically improves 
interagency collaboration.  The U.K. PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif 
was able to bring together individuals from the FOD, the 
DFID, and the MOD.  The cooperative decision making 
established combined goals and policies uniting the PRT and 
increasing interagency collaboration.  Many believe the U.K. 
PRT was the gold standard to use in PRT establishment and 
operation. 
Modeling provides an analytic framework utilizing Game 
Theory’s principles of strategy and risk calculation to 
illustrate the likely outcome of the decision-making 
interaction between the DoD and DoS.  DoD and DoS decision-
making strategies are assigned payoff numbers then the game 
proceeds to determine the likely outcome of the combined 
strategies.  The resulting gaming matrix is a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, meaning each player will choose to better his or 
her outcome by betraying any promise made to the other 
player.  Both the DoD and DoS have significant but different 
advantages in the R&S decision making game.  The S/CRS of 
the DoS has been placed in charge of R&S crisis management 
and operations.  While the DoS has been placed in charge, 
the DoD has significantly more resources available to 
support R&S operations.  The DoS requires DoD resources to 
accomplish R&S crisis management and operations.  
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DoD and DoS organizationally know the best approach to 
effective interagency collaboration is through a whole 
government approach.  While on paper the whole government 
approach is agreed upon, in execution the idea falls short.  
Interagency collaboration works well until individual 
organizational policies and goals differ from the combined 
policies and goals.  Once the policies and goals differ the 
DoD or DoS decision maker defects to support individual 
organizational policies and goals.  Incentives, promises, 
and the threat of retribution need to exist to keep DoS and 
DoD decision makers from defecting to their organizational 
policies and goals.  
Information sharing between the DoD and DoS will 
increase the overall level of the game.  The ways to 
increase the level of information are to create interagency 
R&S doctrine and publications.  This would also include 
Memorandums of Agreement between the DoD and DoS laying out 
organizational responsibilities and tasks.  The R&S 
doctrine, interagency publications, and Memorandums of 
Agreement would help move R&S operations to have clearly 
defined operating procedures and goals.  Information sharing 
can only increase the value of the game if cooperative 
decision making exists.  Unified funding with incentives 
tied directly to defined levels of cooperative decision 
making and unity of command will promote cooperative 
decision making.   
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
R&S crisis management and operations is funded through 
multiple sources with the funding agencies controlling what 
projects are funded.  This hold on R&S funding allows the 
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individual agencies to control R&S decision making.  When 
the policies and goals are not in line with the funding 
agencies policies and goals, projects are not funded.  In 
PRT examples, the DoD controlled funding through CERP funds.  
The majority of the projects funded were quick impact 
projects supporting the DoD policies of seeing immediate 
results. 
To eliminate the funding agencies from influencing R&S 
crisis management and operations, a single funding source 
should be established that is separate from the DoD and DoS.  
This single funding source should support projects that are 
in line with combined DoD and DoS policies and goals.  The 
combined policies and goals should be determined early on to 
provide a clear operating concept for R&S operations.  In 
addition to a single R&S operational funding source, 
incentive funding should be tied to levels of interagency 
cooperative decision making.  Incentives for cooperative 
decision making need to based on agreed upon metrics and 
regulated by a separate oversight agency.  These incentives 
would work similar to a civilian sector bonus for achieving 
established goals and timelines.  The DoD and DoS would 
receive incentive funding for R&S crisis management and 
operations based on their level of cooperative decision 
making with R&S crisis management and operations.   
The second recommendation is to create a unified 
command structure within R&S crisis management and 
operations.  Creating this unified command structure will 
keep accountability on DoS and DoD decision makers within 
R&S crisis management and operations.  The decision makers 
need to be held accountable for their level of cooperative 
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decision making.  As seen in the examples of U.S.-led PRTs 
in Afghanistan, a military commander was in charge on paper 
but really had no control over DoS personnel within the PRT.  
The DoS personnel were evaluated and rated by DoS 
individuals within the Embassy. 
The unified command structure needs to be established 
by interagency doctrine and publications to clearly define 
roles, responsibilities and authorities.  A unified command 
structure would also help to create clearly defined 
operating concepts and solidify individual agency roles 
within R&S crisis management and operations.  The 
environmental factors and situational needs could determine 
if a DoS or DoD individual was placed in command.  However 
the individual in command needs to have authority over all 
the personnel. 
Failed and failing states will continue to persist as 
U.S. national security threats.  R&S crisis management and 
operations will continue to be required.  A whole government 
approach and interagency collaboration sounds easy and good 
on paper, but is extremely difficult in the field.  The 
military has been working to master joint operations for 
over 20 years and arguably still has a long way to go.  
Interagency collaboration during R&S crisis management and 
operations needs to be effective now, not 20 years down the 
road. 
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APPENDIX A.  GAME THEORY AND THE WARRIOR DIPLOMAT: 
USING GAME THEORY TO INCREASE INTERAGENCY 
COOPERATION IN STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION 
OPERATIONS 
A. GAME THEORY TERMINOLOGY 
In an effort to increase the understanding of methods 
used, the following terms are defined when using game 
theory: 
1. The Payoff Matrix of a game is the matrix wherein 
each row corresponds to a player’s maximizing strategy, each 
column corresponds to a players minimizing strategy, and the 
matrix entry is the payoff resulting from the strategy 
choices of that row and column. 
2.  Zero-sum describes a situation in which a player’s 
gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of 
the other player.  It is also called a competitive game. 
3. Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash, in which 
each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of 
the other players, and no player can benefit from changing 
only his or her own strategy unilaterally. 
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APPENDIX B.  GAME THEORY AND THE WARRIOR DIPLOMAT: 
USING GAME THEORY TO INCREASE INTERAGENCY 
COOPERATION IN STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION 
OPERATIONS 
A. NASH ARBITRATION  
 
 
Figure 11.   DOD vs. DOS graph computing Nash arbitration 
solution 
The following are assumed values for the graph. 
A:C–DOD chooses DOD policies and goals; DOS chooses DOS 
policies and goals 
A:D–DOD chooses DOD policies and goals; DOS chooses combined 
policies and goals 
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B:C–DOD chooses combined policies and goals; DOS chooses DOS 
policies and goals 
B:D–DOD chooses combined policies and goals; DOS chooses 
combined policies and goals 
The graph in Figure 11 depicts the payoff polygon for 
the game with cardinal values.  The security levels of the 
DOD and DOS (2,3) are also depicted.  The Pareto Optimal 
points are the Line Segments B:C-B:D-A:D.  The fair point 
for the game, or the Nash Point, is (6.6, 5.875).  In order 
to reach the Nash Point, the following strategies need to be 
played by respective players.  DOD plays a strategy of 
combined policies and goals 100% of the time and DOS plays a 
strategy of DOS policies and goals 17.5% of the time and 
combined policies and goals 82.5% of the time. 
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